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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G. DAYTON HUGHES, 
Plaintiff wnd Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD D. HOOPER, 
Def end ant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10700 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT 
S'rA TEJ\IENT OF ·THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
·This is an action by the owner-driver of an auto-
mobile for injuries and automobile damage arising out 
of an automobile accident which occurred on Sunday, the 
7th day of .June, 1963, at approximately 9 :00 a.m. at an 
open intersection in Provo, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LUWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Joseph E. 
N('lson sitting with a jury. The jury brought in a verdict 
of no cause of action predicated upon its finding that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in 
not keeping a proper lookout. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and judgment in plaintiff's favor as a matter 
of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff and the defendant will, there-
fore, set forth the facts as they must be vie~wed on appeal 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
The accident on which the plaintiff premises his cause 
of action occurred on Sunday the 7th day of June, 1963, 
at appro:X.i:mately 9 :00 a.m. at the intersection of 100 
South and 600 West Streets in Provo, Utah. There were 
no regulatory traffic signs or lights controlling traffic 
at the intersection for either driver. 
The plaintiff was traveling in a northerly direction 
on 6th West Street, and the defendant proceeding east-
erly on 100 South Street. On the southwest corner of the 
intersection there stood a home (Defendant's Exhibits 
12 and 13, and plaintiff's Exhibit 6), the north side of 
which was approximately 33 feet from the south curb on 
100 South Street and the front of which approximately 
56 feet west of the west curb on 6th WPst Street. (See 
plaintiff's Exhibit 6.) Plaintiff testified that there were 
several cars parked along the south side of 100 South 
Street beginning at a point approximately 30 feet west 
of the west curb line of 6th West Street (R. 138) which 
obstructed his view. Defendant did not recall seeing any 
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vehicle parked on the south side of 100 South Street (R. 
166-167). 
From a point approximately 120 feet west and 120 feet 
f;outh of the point of imvact each of the drivers could 
have seen the other within those distances. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 6) Plaintiff testified that he observed the parked 
H'hicles as he approached the intersection (R. 73, 7 4) and 
that they did obstruct his vision (R. 73). Plaintiff 
approached the intersedion at a speed of approximately 
20 to 25 miles per hour according to his own testimony 
<R. 12, 137). Defendant testified that he approached 
the intersection, also, at a speed o.f about 25 miles per 
hour and in his proper lane of traffic (R. 164), and that 
plaintiff was traveling at about the same speed as defen-
dant. As defendant approached the intersection, he 
looked first to the right and then to the left seeing no 
traffic on either occasion and then glanced back to his 
right again and saw the plaintiff's car at about the south 
cross-walk at a time when his vehicle was then at about 
the west cross-walk (R. 165). The defendant immediate-
ly applied his brakes (R. 165), skidded for about 10 feet 
(R. 7), and struck the vehicle of the plaintiff in the right 
side with the left headlight portion of the defendant's 
vehicle striking the plaintiff's vehicle over the left wheel 
well and the right headlight striking the left door of the 
plaintiff's vehicle (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1). The two 
\rehicles then proceeded in a generally northeasterly di-
rection side by side and came to rest on the northeast 
corner of the intersection. 
'The investigating officer located the point of impact 
:J,C\ ft•d Past of the west cross walk at the intersection 
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(28 feet from W('St curhline) and 28 feet north of thP 
south cross-walk at the intersection (18 feet from south 
enrbline) and measured an additional 5 feet from the 
fo1·,rnrd point of impact on }Jlaintiff's VPhicle to the 
front of the plaintiff's vehiC'le indicating that the plain-
tiff's vehicle was 33 feet from the south cross-walk at 
time of impact. The nearest west cross-walk line was 10 
feet from the curb and the south cross-walk line 10 feet 
from south curb. Each street was approximately 50 feet 
wide (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6). Defendant recognized 
that the cars parked along the south side of the intersec-
tion would constitute a hazard to his view (R. 140), and 
further testified that there was only a fraction of a sec-
ond for him to determine whether or not any cars were 
approaching (R. 140, 141), and that there was just a 
fraction of a second from the time he saw the defendant's 
vehicle until the impact occurred ( R. 142). Defendant 
testified that plaintiff was looking straight ahead and 
did not turn his head toward the defendant at any time 
after he saw him (R. 166). Plaintiff further testified that 
about one-third of his car \Vas in the intersection at the 
time he saw the defendant's vehicle 15 feet from him 
(R. 1±1-). He told the investigating officer he first saw 
the Hooper vehicle at time of impact (R. 42). 
The two ears entered the intersection at about the 
same time (R. 165-166) and it was a close question as to 
who had the technical right-of-way. 
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ARGFMENT 
POINT I. 
THJ,_: VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE SU~TAINED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID 
NOT ERR. IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAIN'rIFF. 
The jury made an express finding that the plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence in the operation of his vehicle 
by not keeping a proper lookout and that he, therefore, 
could not recover on his complaint. 
The basic question involved in the appeal is, there-
fore, whether or not there was sufficient evidence of 
plaintiff's failure to keep a proper lookout produced at 
the trial to support the court's presentation of this issue 
to the jury, and the jury's finding of contributory negli-
gence upon the part of the plaintiff. 
The question of contributory negligence is usually 
for the jury and the court should be reluctant to take 
consideration of this question of fact from it. Nielson v. 
ilf ailchley, Utah 115 Ut. 68, 202 P. 2d 5-17; Toomers Estate 
0·. Union Pacific Railroad Co., Utah, 121 Ut. 37, 239 P. 2d 
1G3; Martin v. Stevens, Utah 121 Lt. -!8-1, 2-!i) P. 2d 7-1:7. 
Plaintiff testified that he did not see the defendant 
vd1icle until the defendant vehicle was already in the 
intersection and when the vehicle was not more than 
15 feet from the plaintiff vehicle. In fact the jury could 
have found that plaintiff did not see the vehicle of the 
defendant at all until impact. The investigating officer 
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testified that in the conversation he had with plaintiff 
after the accident the plaintiff told him that he did not 
see defendant's vehicle until the time of impact ( R. 42). 
There was also evidence that the plaintiff did not look 
at all because the defendant testified that he saw tlw 
plaintiff vehicle when plaintiff's vehicle was at about 
the south cross-walk as defendant was at about the west 
cross-walk and the plaintiff was looking straight ahead 
and did not turn his head tmvard the defendant at any-
time after defendant saw the plaintiff (R. 166). By his 
own testimony plaintiff did not look at all until he was 
15-20 feet from the intersection which would place his 
vehicle in the vicinity of the south cross-vvalk. The fact 
that he left no skid marks at all certainly supports the 
defendant's testimony and the plaintiff's that plaintiff 
either did not see the defendant vehicle at all or until 
a fraction of a second before impact. In fact, plaintiff 
ks ti fiecl that when he first looked, there was only a frac-
tion of a second between that time and the time of impact. 
(By Mr. Summerhays to :Mr. Hughes) 
Q. Now you say there was not much time from 
15-20 feet back to determine whether or not 
there was a car there, is this corrc>,ct'? 
A. It would only be a matter of a split second. 
Q. Fraction of a second. 
A. Yes. (R. 140-14-1) 
The plaintiff was aware of the fact that the greatrst 
danger to him would he from a car coming from his left 
in his line of traffic (R. 143), but he did not look until 
he was 15-20 feet from the intersection by his own testi-
mony. 
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If there were cars parked along the south side of 
100 South Street, there was still some distance between 
the north side of the house and the parked cars ( 33 feet 
or more) and knowing that his view would be blocked 
up close to the intersection placed a duty upon plaintiff 
to look for approaching cars from a point in between the 
house and the parked cars. He made no attempt to look, 
though he saw the parked cars in advance and knew they 
would constitute a hazard to his vision. 
(Mr. Summerhays to :Mr. Hughes) 
Q. You knew then, that those cars constituted a 
hazard to your vision, did you no·t 1 
A. I didn't have much time to analyze it. It 'vas 
only a matter of split second or two. 
Q. Yes, but as you approached the intersection, 
you could see that the cars were parked along 
the intersection, could you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew that they would constitute a 
hazard to your view, did you not? 
A. I would say that I knew that. 
(R. 139, 140) 
If the parked cars created a dangerous situation, 
then plaintiff's duty was to use additional caution in 
accordance with the existing conditions creating the 
increased danger. Klenk v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 
27 Ut. 428, 76 P. 214; Mallard v. Sims, 173 \Vash. 649, 
24 P. 2d 70. The amount of caution required by the law 
increases, as does the danger that reasonably should be 
apprehended. 
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If the plaintiff wai'l going to rnsh lwadlong into th(• 
intersection, he should have used every opportunity avail-
able to determine whether tlwre were any cars approach-
ing. Orn_• can by carefully observing look through the 
windows of parked cars for possible movt•nwnt of 
approaching cars. Plaintiff failed in his duty in r<>gard 
to all of these possibilities. 
The fact is that the defendant's vehiele ·was ap-
proaching close to the intersection at the same time as 
tlw plaintiff was approaching, and the car was there to 
be seen. The plaintiff's duty is not fulfilled by merely 
taking a quick glance, or none. He is charged with seeing 
what is there to be seen, and it is a jury question as to 
whether the vehicle of the defendant \ms there to lw 
seen, \vhether plaintiff fufilled his duty in keeping a 
proper lookout and whether his failure, if any, was a 
proximate cause of the accident. 11!f artin v. Stevens, 
supra; Karl TY. Badger 'l'. Paul Taylor Clayson, Utah, 
filed January 3, 1967, Case No. 10517. 
Plaintiff has submitted an extensive argument to show 
that defendant was traveling at an exe(•ssivl~ s1>eed and 
that plaintiff entered the intersE.'etion first. In answt>r 
to said argument defendant points out some of the falla-
cit•s and weaknesses of th<> elaimecl facts and the 
conclusions drawn therefrorn upon which plaintiff\; argu-
ment is based. 
Officer Baum testified that in his opm10n the d('-
fendant was going 35--10 rniks per hour (R. 21). Ile 
based this upon the 10 feet of skid marks whieh lw ob-
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se>rved plus the impact and the distance the cars traveled 
after impact and the use of a skid chart (R. 21). Officer 
Baum had only heen an officer for f:ight months at the 
time the accident occurred (R. 18). He had had two weeks 
training at the Utah Highway Academy at National 
Uuard Camp covering all phases of a police officer's 
duties (R. 18). He did not know even approximately how 
many accidents he had investigated ( R. 19). 
In making his calculations he did not sub~tract the 
wheelbase of the car from the distance the car traveled 
after impact (R. 31). The 4-7 feet the defendant vehicle 
traveled after impact consisted of scuff marks, how many 
lw was not sure (R. 36). During the last 19 feet the 
hrn cars traveled he admitted they were rolling together 
(R. 46). The officer also admitted that the speed of the 
plaintiff's vehicle would have carried the defendant's 
vehicle to the north and cause part of the scuff marks 
(R. -±0), but he did not in fact take this into consideration 
in computing the speed. He admitted that he just folt 
like Mr. Hughes' speed was 20 miles per hour (R. 41), 
and that it could have been calculated, but he didn't know 
how to do it (R. 41). He actually went on Mr. Hughes' 
statement. He at first gave Mr. Hughes a ticket for fail-
me to yield the right-of-way but later after talking to 
other officers decided not to press it (R. 23-24). 
In connection with the witness Coon's testimony, he 
assumed a speed of 20 miles per hour for Mr. Hughes 
hecause this is the speed Mr. Hughes stated he was 
going, and this is the speed the officer told Mr. Coon 
Hughes was going (R. 54-). His subsequent calculation 
of speed was determined from the position of the vehicles 
after impact along with other factors, but the location 
of the vehicles after impact as far as mcasnn'mcnts 
\H•re concerned was never introduced into evidence (R. 
70-71). His calculations werP, therefore, not based on 
facts in evidence (R. 71). 
Using the figures given him, however, he placed 
the vehicles as coming into the intersection at a time 
interval of .15 seconds apart or eight feet. The accuracy 
of this finding was quite questionable, and the jury would 
certainly have been justified in coming to some other 
conclusion. They could have found actually that the 
defendant entered the intersection slightly ahead of the 
plaintiff. 
Whatever their finding may have been on right-of-way 
it is clear that they found him guilty of negligence for 
failurP to keep a proper lookout. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury is clearly sustained by the 
evidence, and the court properly submitted the case to the 
jury. The judgment of the court should, therefore, be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI and 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
604- Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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